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LovE AND MARRIAGE IN THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE: WHY No-SPOUSE POLICIES DON'T
WORK
Saily M. Avelendat
Imagine this hypothetical situation: You start your new job at
Corporation X. You meet Mr. Right (or Ms. Right) at the copy machine
over a helping of double-sided copying. Over the next few weeks, you
engage in an appropriate level of mutual flirting-enough to make a point,
but not enough to be obvious. After a few months of cautious dating,
during which time you have successfully avoided becoming the subject of
pernicious office gossip, you decide to get married. You dream of living
happily ever after as Mr. and Mrs. Right. However, your wedded bliss is
unexpectedly interrupted by an untimely wedding present from Corporation
X-one of you has been fired for violating the company's "no-spouse"
policy prohibiting spouses from working together in the same company.
Consider this variation: Ms. Right (or Mr. Right) works for
Corporation Y, Corporation X's largest competitor. You have been dating
in secret for a few months and you decide to marry. You are both closet
law junkies and therefore are aware that State A, where you both work and
reside, has an antidiscrimination statute prohibiting marital status
discrimination. Despite this statutory protection, one of you is fired.
Are these employment decisions legal? According to case law,
probably.
It is a well-established legal principle that marriage is a fundamental
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right.' It is also established that every married couple has a fundamental
right to procreate, to control procreation through the use of birth control,2
and, subject to some limitations, to terminate a pregnancy.3  There is,
however, no general right to employment,4 much less a right to work with
one's spouse. Thus, in the hypothetical situations outlined above, either
Mr. or Mrs. Right will be gainfully unemployed as a result of the marriage.
Unfortunately, current law affords the Rights little recourse. Absent a state
prohibition to the contrary (or even in the face of such a prohibition), an
employer may discriminate against an employee because of his or her
marital status through no-spouse and antinepotism policies.5 In addition,
courts frequently decide in favor of employers who have discriminated
against employees based on marital status, even in states that specifically
prohibit marital status discrimination.
6
The New American Webster Dictionary defines "nepotism" as "undue
1. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 17 (1967) (stating that "[u]nder our
Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not marry, .. . resides with the individual and cannot
be infringed by the State"); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) ("It is
not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level of importance as
decisions relating to procreation, childbirth, child rearing, and family relationships.").
2. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding that a Connecticut
law forbidding the use of contraceptives was unnecessarily broad and invasive of
constitutionally-protected freedoms).
3. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that a Texas criminal abortion
statute prohibiting abortions at any time during pregnancy, except to save the life of the
mother, was unconstitutional).
4. Employment relationships are generally governed by contract law. Absent an
express written agreement defining specifically the length of employment, an employer-
employee relationship is deemed "at will."
5. In general, "no-spouse" policies encompass "any rule against husband-wife
employment." 1996 Guide to Fair Employment Practices, 535 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 320,
at 85 (Jan. 24, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Guide]. In contrast, antinepotism policies generally
prohibit relatives from working together. Since there is no set form for such policies, most
employers adopt a hybrid policy. See Joan G. Wexler, Husbands and Wives: The Uneasy
Case for Antinepotism Rules, 62 B.U. L. REV. 75, 81-82 (1982) (discussing the vast
differences among employer antinepotism and no-spouse policies). Employers may use
antinepotism policies as a means of preventing spouses from working together. See, e.g., id.
at 78. Thus, antinepotism policies can have the same effect as no-spouse policies. Although
this Comment will deal specifically with the arguments for abolishing spousal policies,
similar arguments may be applied to antinepotism policies. Therefore, the terms
"antinepotism" and "no-spouse" will be used interchangeably at times.
6. See, e.g., Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 793 (Alaska 1996)
(holding that under Alaska's antidiscrimination statute, which includes a provision making it
unlawful to discriminate based on marital status, an employer is not prohibited from
discriminating against an employee based upon the identity of a spouse); Boaden v.
Department of Law Enforcement, 642 N.E.2d 1330, 1335 (Il. App. Ct. 1994) (holding that
under Illinois' marital discrimination statute, "no-spouse policies precluding employment on
the basis of spousal identity do not constitute unlawful discrimination based upon marital
status").
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favoritism to relatives. ' 7  Derived from the Latin word for nephew,
8
nepotistic practices were originally "directed at the hiring of incompetent
male relatives." 9 Thus, when originally conceived, these rules had little or
no impact on the female workforce. "Undoubtedly because women did not
constitute a significant part of the professional or managerial workforce...
[decades ago], such rules had minimal effect on daughters, nieces, female
cousins, or wives. In recent years, however, women have begun to enter
the workforce in unprecedented numbers."10 The growing popularity of
no-spouse and antinepotism policies in the workplace, in combination with
the increase in the size of the female workforce (especially in high-level
positions) has adversely impacted women by restricting the number of jobs
available to them.
No-spouse and antinepotism policies come in various forms." Some
company policies prohibit either relatives or spouses (or both) from
working in the same plant, office, branch, department, or company. Other
policies prohibit a supervisory relationship between spouses and/or
relatives.12 Still further, some companies consider the identity of one's
spouse when making hiring and firing decisions.1 3 Regardless of form,
however, no-spouse and antinepotism policies in the workplace are
unjustifiable, antiquated, and unnecessary for running an effective and
profitable business.
One reason why no-spouse and antinepotism policies are unsound is
that they are based on inaccurate and antiquated notions about spousal
relationships. For example, typical business justifications for such policies
rely on outdated stereotypes regarding the inability of spouses to work
together. As one commentator has noted, since governments have enacted
antidiscrimination statutes to prevent discrimination based on stereotypical
notions of classes of people, no-spouse policies should also be prohibited
7. THE NEW AMERICAN WEBSTER HANDY COLLEGE DICTIONARY 356 (198 1). Professor
Wexler, in her seminal piece on antinepotism policies, traces the roots of nepotistic practices
throughout history, finding such practices commonplace during the Industrial Revolution
and in the Roman Catholic Church during the Middle Ages. In the United States, "[t]he
founders of large corporations and other businesses often followed the English practice of
keeping management 'in the family,' believing that an important purpose of a prosperous
business was to provide employment for sons and other kin." Wexler, supra note 5, at 76.
8. See Wexler, supra note 5, at 75.
9. Id. at 77.
10. Id.; see also Dennis Alerding, Note, The Family that Works Together ... Can't: No
Spouse Rules as Marital Status Discrimination Under State and Federal Law, 32 U.
LouisviLLEJ. FAi. L. 867, 868 (1994).
11. See 1996 Guide, supra note 5, at 85; see also Alerding, supra note 10, at 868-89.
12. See Stephen B. Humphress, Note, State Protection Against Marital Status
Discrimination by Employers, 31 U. LOuisvILLE J. FAm. L. 919, 927 (1992).
13. See, e.g., Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 793 (Alaska 1996)
(upholding BP's antinepotism policy that considered spousal identity).
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because these policies are based on the stereotypical assumption that
spouses are -"unable to leave their personal problems at home, are
competitive, and... cannot adequately supervise [each other]. 14
No-spouse policies are also unsound because they do not take into
account the changing composition of the American workforce and thus
have the effect of discriminating against women by restricting the labor
market. The American workforce is approximately forty-five percent
female. 15 By the year 2000, the American workforce will be sixty percent
female.16  Employers and potential employees alike are significantly
affected by the adverse and unexpected consequences of antinepotism and
no-spouse policies. "A shrinking high-skill labor pool and the growing
number of women entering the workforce is requiring more employers to
face the issue of nepotism."' 17 Conversely, the female labor force is facing
a restrictive labor market, making it difficult for them to find and secure
jobs.
Ultimately, however, the strongest argument against no-spouse
policies is that they implicate protected constitutional rights, such as the
right to marry and the right of association. By strictly enforcing
antinepotism and no-spouse policies in the workforce, "[e]mployers have
attempted to control or interfere with the most intimate and personal details
of an individual's life."' 8 Despite this admonition, however, courts have
continued to rule that antinepotism policies do not infringe on one's
fundamental right to marry or associate. 19 In so ruling, courts contend that,
in theory, employees remain free to marry, so long as they do not marry a
coworker. Courts also maintain that spouses are free to work elsewhere.
However, courts have consistently ignored the practical aspects of their
holding: antinepotism policies punish coworkers who marry, because of
their decision to marry. What results is a court-sanctioned policy that
inadvertently discourages marriage and promotes cohabitation and divorce.
No-spouse policies that formally or informally discriminate based on
14. Anna Giattina, Note, Challenging No-Spouse Employment Policies as Marital
Status Discrimination: A Balancing Approach, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1111, 1126 (1987).
15. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table A-i, Employment Status of the Civilian
Population by Sex and Age (visited Oct. 30, 1998) <http:llwww.bls.gov/news.release/
empsit.tOl.htm>.
16. See Alexis A. Yerkes, Tips on Making a Point Like a Man, WORKING WOMEN, Mar.
2, 1997, at 6F.
17. Anti-Nepotism Policies Said Increasing; Care Needed in Developing Good Policies,
20 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at C-1 (Feb. 2, 1987) [hereinafter Anti-Nepotism Policies Said
Increasing].
18. Nancy Erika Smith & Kyle M. Francis, Beyond the Company Town: Employees'
Right to Privacy Regarding Off-Duty Conduct, N.J. LAW., Jan. 1994, at 13.
19. See, e.g., Parks v. City of Warner Robins, 43 F.3d 609, 616 (11th Cir. 1995)
(holding that the city's antinepotism policy did not infiinge on Brenda Parks's fundamental
right to marry).
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spousal identity, occupation, and employment are, arguably, the most
indefensible of the no-spouse policies. Employers seeking to justify these
policies argue for the need to preserve confidentiality and loyalty in the
workplace. They fear that if an employee is married to a competitor, or to a
supervisor in the same company, the relationship may create a conflict of
interest.2 The fact that only married relationships are prohibited in this
context, as opposed to unmarried relationships, proves inconsistent with
employers' concerns.21
Part I of this Comment will argue, generally, that no-spouse policies
explicitly forbidding married couples from working for the same employer
should no longer be upheld by the courts. Even in light of supposedly
legitimate business concerns, courts must assign more weight to the
constitutional interests at stake if they are to discourage discrimination in
the workplace effectively. In particular, Part I argues that company
policies that discriminate based upon the identity of a person's spouse
should be prohibited because such policies lead to inconsistent results.
Furthermore, they place unnecessary burdens upon a person's right of
association and fundamental right to marry.
Part II of this Comment will examine recent legal interpretations of
the term "marital status" in marital status discrimination suits. Based on
varying definitions of marital status, courts have reached "vastly different
conclusions" about what constitutes unlawful marital status
discrimination. 22 Some courts have followed a narrow approach, finding
discrimination only when an individual is treated differently based on
whether he or she is married or unmarried, but not when an individual is
treated differently based on the identity of his or her spouse. z3 Other courts
have adopted a broader approach, including spousal identity within the
broad definition of marital status.24 In defining marital status, courts have
relied on the legislative intent of the existing statutes pertaining to
20. See KURT H. DECKER, EMPLOYEE PRIVAcY LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.27, at 337
(1987) (stating that it is considered a "legitimate business practice" to disqualify "male and
female applicants or employees who are married to a competitor's employees").
21. See Thompson v. Board of Trustees, 627 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Mont. 1981) (stating that
interpreting marital status narrowly is "unreasonable, and could lead to an absurd result....
[l]f [the] plaintiff and his wife were simply to dissolve their marriage, both could keep their
jobs. But for the fact [that] this plaintiff is married, he would still be working.").
22. John C. Beattie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for
the Protection of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1415, 1419 (1991).
23. See, e.g., Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State Human Rights Appeal Bd.,
415 N.E.2d 950, 964 (N.Y. 1980) (finding that marital status involved "a choice among
'married,' 'single,' etc., but would not.., include an identification of one's present or
former spouse").
24. See, e.g., River Bend Community Unit Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Human Rights Comm'n,
597 N.E.2d 842, 846 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (liberally construing the term "marital status" to
include spousal identity).
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antinepotism and antispouse policies.25 Few statutes, however, clearly
outline the legislative intent behind including the term "marital status."
Therefore, courts are left to their own devices in defining the term. In
response to the differing definitions of marital status available, this
Comment argues that courts should adopt the more expansive
interpretation, as this interpretation is most consistent with the legislative
intent of most state antidiscrimination statutes.
I. WHY No-SPOUSE POLICES DON'T WORK
A. The "New Look" of the Twenty-First Century Workforce
The rise in the number of working females, particularly married
females, has brought increased attention to employment policies restricting
spousal employment.26 Of the 105 million women sixteen years of age and
older living in the United States, sixty-three million were considered "labor
force participants" (working or looking for work) during 1997.27
Furthermore, the Federal Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates that there are
currently more than fifty-three million married couples in the United
States.28 Of these married couples, approximately 28.4 million had both
spouses working outside the home in 1997.29
25. See Beattie, supra note 22, at 1428; see also Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska)
Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 787 (Alaska 1996) ("In construing the meaning of a statute, we look to
the meaning of the language, the legislative history, and the purpose of the statute in
question.").
26. John J. Ross, The Employment Law Year in Review, 547 P.L.I. LrrG. 9, 123 (1996).
In 1966, 66.9 percent of the population age 16 years and older had a job at some
point during the year... . [That number increased to 69.5 percent in 1994 and
1995.] This long-term rise in work activity reflects the increasing likelihood
that women will work outside the home. While women are still less likely than
men to engage in market work, the proportion of women who work rose from
50.4 percent in 1966 to 63.1 percent in 1996.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Work Experience Summary (visited Oct. 30, 1998)
<http:llwww.bls.gov/news.release/work.nws.htm>.
27. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table A-1, Employment Status of the Civilian
Population by Sex and Age (visited Oct. 30, 1998) <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/
empsit.t01.htm>. In 1992, the number of female labor force participants was 58 million.
See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Access to historical data for the "A'" tables of the
Employment Situation News Release (visited Oct. 30, 1998) <http://www.bls.gov/
cpsatabs.htm>.
28. See James Podgers, Marriage Traps in the Workplace: Nepotism Rules Make it
Harder For Spouses to be Colleagues in Public Sector, 82 A.B.A. J., Jan. 1994, at 46.
29. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 2. Families by presence and relationship of
employed members and family type, 1996-97 annual averages (visited Oct. 30, 1998)
<http:llwww.bls.gov/news.release/famee.t02.htm>. In 1993, 24.8 million couples were two-
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The magnitude of these figures produces two distinct consequences:
more couples are likely to meet at work and more married couples are
likely to become coworkers. On the issue of coworker dating, one observer
has noted that "although the [B]ureau [of Labor Statistics] does not have
figures on how many of those couples work for the same employer, it
stands to reason that, with more women in the work force-in a growing
variety of positions-more people are likely to meet their spouses at
work., 30  Most importantly, however, is the interaction between these
figures and the increased enforcement of antinepotism and no-spouse
policies by employers. Since more women in the workplace means that "a
greater possibility exists that husbands and wives will seek employment in
the same field,"31 it follows that married couples will be facing stubborn
applications of no-spouse policies, oftentimes with little rational
justification. This effect is more "salient as more and more women enter
the labor market in which their husbands are already employed. 32
No-spouse policies also raise problems when a married couple seeks
employment simultaneously in the same labor market, perhaps because the
couple has moved to a new area. In this situation, where it does not matter
which spouse was employed first, no-spouse policies may operate to limit
the couple's overall marketability, thereby preventing them not only from
working together, but also from obtaining the best possible jobs. "In small
communities with one or two major employers, spouses may have a
difficult time finding jobs with different employers. 33  The problem
becomes more obvious when both spouses are actually employed in the
same field. In the academic world, for example, "married couples [for
several decades] ... have confronted rules barring them from employment
career couples. See Podgers, supra note 28, at 46.
30. Podgers, supra note 28, at 46. "As more women have entered the workforce and
time to socialize outside of work has decreased, employees have increasingly looked to the
workplace as a place to form romantic attachments." Anna M. DePalo, Antifraternizing
Policies and At-Will Employment: Counseling for a Better Relationship, 1996 ANN. SURv.
AM. L. 59, 102 (1996). In fact, "[riecent studies have found that 'about 80 percent of
employees have either observed or been in a romantic relationship at their workplace.' As
employees spend more time at work, this percentage will certainly increase." Jennifer Dean,
Note, Employer Regulation of Employee Personal Relationships, 76 B.U. L. REv. 1051,
1073-74 (1996) (citation omitted).
31. Giattina, supra note 14, at 1114-15.
32. Leonard Bierman & Cynthia D. Fisher, Antinepotism Rules Applied to Spouses:
Business and Legal Viewpoints, 35 LAB. L.J. 634, 634 (1984).
33. Giattina, supra note 14, at 1115. See also Anti-Nepotism Policies Said Increasing,
supra note 16, at C-1 ("[E]mployers in remote areas or in one-employer communities are
unable to attract talented employees who are part of two-career couples if they exclude
spouses from employment... ."); Wexler, supra note 5, at 79 ("Although these restrictions
on employment may appear to be de minimis because they leave the spouse free to work
elsewhere, that option is frequently not available.").
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in the same college or university."' 4 Similarly, marriages between lawyers
employed in the same law firm have been met with controversy.
35
Generally, marriages between associates are acceptable, perhaps because
"firms... believe it likely that one or both associates will leave the firm"
eventually.36 However, marriages between partners and associates are
generally disfavored.37
Although antinepotism policies have existed for much of the twentieth
century, it is only in the last thirty years that they have had a significant
impact in the business arena. In a 1955 survey, only seven percent of 379
companies had formal antinepotism policies.38 In 1963, a survey of 530
American companies found that twenty-eight percent had formal
antinepotism policies.39 In a 1977 survey conducted by the Bureau of
National Affairs' Personnel Policies Forum, sixty percent of respondents
had formal antinepotism policies.4° These results suggest that during the
1960s and 1970s, corporate America formalized what previously had been
an informal policy of preventing spouses and relatives from working
together,41 thus lending credence to the notion that increased application of
these policies has mirrored the increase in female participation in the
workforce.
The steady growth and enforcement of corporate antinepotism policies
also mirrors employers' increasing concerns about, and interference in,
their employees' personal spheres. Thus, the business world's concern for
profits has led employers down a previously uncharted path-monitoring
employees' personal relationships. 42
As a result of this increased monitoring, many employers have enacted
"antifratemization" policies in the workplace. These policies are aimed
specifically at discouraging and/or prohibiting romantic relationships
34. Wexler, supra note 5, at 88. Professor Wexler recounts the story of Maria
Geopperet Mayer, who, along with her husband, was a professor at the University of
Chicago in the 1950s. Because of the University's strict antinepotism policy, Mayer
received no salary for her services. However, once she and her husband threatened to leave,
the University offered Mayer a salary in order to persuade them both to stay. Mayer was
later awarded the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1963. See id. at 88 n.58.
35. See id. at 83-85. It is interesting to note that "[n]epotism has a proud tradition at the
bar. During the first half of this century, many of today's major [law] firms routinely
employed sons and sons-in-law." Id. at 83.
36. Id. at 84 n.39.
37. See id.
38. See id. at 77 (citing The Son Also Rises, WALL ST. J., Apr. 1, 1964, at 1).
39. See Bierman & Fisher, supra note 32, at 634.
40. See Anti-Nepotism Policies Said Increasing, supra note 17, at C-1.
41. Indeed, "a survey of 252 members of the American Society for Personnel
Administration reveals that nearly 90 percent of the companies had adopted their present
policies since 1970." Id.
42. See Dean, supra note 30, at 1051.
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between coworkers. 43 Like antinepotism and no-spouse policies, these
rules present a substantial barrier both to individual employee privacy and
to broader notions of privacy. Ultimately, they may also hinder the
advancement of women."
Antinepotism, antispouse, and antifraternization policies raise serious
concerns for both employers and employees. Employers, with some
support from the courts, should strive to develop creative solutions that
accommodate both their need to maximize profits and the employee's need
for privacy.45 However, instead of rising to the challenges of the workforce
in the new millennium, employers continue to adhere to ineffectual policies
that are deeply rooted in historical stereotypes.
B. Addressing the Business Justifications for No-Spouse Policies
Employers provide numerous justifications for no-spouse policies. As
noted previously, antinepotism policies were originally aimed at
"prohibiting the employment of incompetent male relatives of male
employees."'46 However, these rules now apply to coworkers who marry, as
well as husbands, wives, and blood relatives who seek employment with
the same employer. Modern business justifications for antinepotism and
no-spouse policies presuppose that married persons (and relatives) are
unable to remain objective if they work alongside one another or in
43. See DePalo, supra note 30, at 59-60. As with antinepotism and no-spouse policies,
antifraternization rules may be formal, written, and known to the employees or they may be
informal, unwritten, and ambiguous. See Dean, supra note 30, at 1051. These policies are
generally motivated by a fear of sexual harassment liability, concerns about favoritism,
statutory rape charges, and/or workplace violence. See id. at 1052-53. For an in-depth
analysis of these and other justifications for antifraterization policies, see generally Dean,
supra note 30 and DePalo, supra note 30.
44. Although this result is not so easily inferred in the antifraterrization context, it is
not difficult to envision a situation where a romantic relationship with a coworker would
lead to the termination of one (or both) employees. Since women are more likely to hold
lesser positions than men in most industries, the likelihood increases that such terminations
may disproportionately affect women.
45. With respect to personal relationships in the workplace, commentators have
argued that employers should adopt clear coworker dating policies that restrict
coworker dating only in supervisor-subordinate relationships [where the threat of
sexual harassment liability is arguably greatest]. With respect to personal
relationships outside the workplace, employers should adopt confidentiality
agreements with employees, rather than restrictive dating policies, to ensure non-
disclosure of confidential information to competitors' employees and others.
Such policies will strike the proper balance between the privacy interests of
employees and the business interests of the employer.
Dean, supra note 30, at 1053. These creative alternatives can also be tailored to fit the
needs of married coworkers.
46. Bierman & Fisher, supra note 32, at 635.
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competing companies. According to employers, this presumed lack of
objectivity invariably affects both spouses' abilities to perform their job
responsibilities effectively.47 However, this presumption is merely a
typical manifestation of unreliable stereotypes relating to the ability of
couples to work together. "Courts should not permit employers to base
employment decisions on stereotypes regarding a married person's ability
to perform when a spouse works in the same company for the same reason
employers are not permitted to base employment decisions on stereotypes
regarding race or sex.
48
Proponents of antinepotism policies are concerned that employing
relatives and spouses may affect productivity and efficiency. For example,
companies fear that "[w]ork time may be spent solving personal problems
with the spouses rather than working." 49 However,
[t]o the extent that such reasoning paternalistically attempts to
protect the couple involved, it is not persuasive .... On the other
hand, to the extent this reasoning focuses on the employer's
interests, the argument proves too much. If in fact the married
couple is always fighting in the office, one or both of them can be
terminated-like any other employee-for abusive or
inappropriate conduct. '
Employing spouses may also result in administrative difficulties
involving vacation days, sick days, and scheduling similar shifts.51 When
not fighting, married employees are charged with four sins: 1) advancing
their own interests at the employer's expense;52 2) acting out of concern for
47. Such justifications, however, ignore the fact that thousands of successful businesses
in the United States are owned and operated by families. According to Professor Wexler:
[T]he idea of the family as both a personal refuge and a principal unit of
production is as old as the nation. During the colonial period, women worked
alongside their husbands in agricultural pursuits.... After industrialization,
married couples frequently worked together either in 'mom and pop'
businesses, or in factories. Not until the first half of this century did it become
far less common for a husband and wife to share a place of employment.
Wexler, supra note 5, at 78-79 n.19 (citations omitted).
48. Giattina, supra note 14, at 1128.
49. Bierman & Fisher, supra note 32, at 635. Furthermore, employers believe that
"married individuals may compare their salaries and career progress with each other and
become jealous and/or overly competitive." Id.; see Kim L. Kim, No-Spouse Rules in the
Workplace under Illinois and Federal Law, 82 ILL. B.J. 414, 419 (1994).
50. Wexler, supra note 5, at 136.
51. See Bierman & Fisher, supra note 32, at 635; Humphress, supra note 12, at 928
(identifying several concerns expressed by employers in adopting no-spouse and
antinepotism policies); see also Kim, supra note 49, at 419 (noting also that since
"[s]pouses are likely to use the same car.., if one is late or absent, the other will be also").
52. See Bierman & Fisher, supra note 32, at 635; Kim, supra note 49, at 419; Wexler,
supra note 5, at 112.
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each other in emergency situations, thereby jeopardizing the safety of
fellow coworkers; 53 3) pressuring employers to hire (unqualified or
qualified) spouses or relatives;-4 and 4) unfairly procuring two jobs in an
already scarce job market.5 It is for these sins that married employees are
being singled out for terminations, forced resignations, and other sanctions.
These business rationales used to justify antinepotism practices are
simply "not persuasive." 56 First, "[n]one of these potential problems has
been demonstrated to occur to any great extent."57 As one commentator
has noted, while "[miany times an employer can document instances in
which one of these problems has occurred... most employers cannot
produce evidence that these problems are pervasive in the workplace, and
thus cannot support a complete ban on spouses working together."
58
Second, banning spouses and relatives from the workplace will not
necessarily eliminate the concerns expressed. For example, "the problems
of jealousy and animosity are not peculiar to spouses; employees who are
unrelated but who spend significant amounts of time working together are
no more immune from such feelings than are related employees." 59
Furthermore, favoritism can also occur in situations where employees are
dating but are not married. 6° Hence, "[i]f the evil to be averted is the
display of favoritism between spouses, it is not necessary to bar completely
the employment of spouses to achieve that goal. 61 Therefore, banning
spouses, but not friends or significant others, from the workplace seems
inconsiftent with the underlying business rationale for the rule.
An employee acting as a supervisor for his or her spouse presents
more difficult problems. Employers fear that, in this situation, the
supervising spouse might display favoritism toward the spouse in
disciplinary and other matters, thereby causing resentment among fellow
employees. 62 These concerns are legitimate and should be addressed by
employers.63 However, there are alternatives to firing (or not hiring) when
53. See Bierman & Fisher, supra note 32, at 636; Kim, supra note 49, at 419.
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. Wexler, supra note 5, at 112.
57. Bierman & Fisher, supra note 32, at 636.
58. Kim, supra note 49, at 419.
59. Wexler, supra note 5, at 136; see Bierman & Fisher, supra note 32, at 636 ("mhe
alleged problems could occur just as easily between good friends at work as between
spouses.").
60. Cf. Bierman & Fisher, supra note 32, at 636 ("[I]n the case of spouses who marry
after employment, if problems along these lines did not occur during courting and
engagement, there is little reason to expect them to occur after marriage.").
61. Wexler, supra note 5, at 134.
62. See Bierman & Fisher, supra note 32, at 636.
63. Indeed, even states with marital status provisions in their antidiscrimination statutes
grant employers the ability to regulate (and even prohibit) a supervisory relationship
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spouses have (or would have) a supervisory-subordinate relationship. For
example, applicants seeking employment with their spouse's employer
could be hired into another department or division without raising concerns
about confidentiality, diminished job performance, or favoritism. Courts
may find that a no-spouse policy that does not "forbid employment or force
a married spouse's termination," but recognizes that some positions are
inappropriate for spouses to hold, does not place unfair restrictions on
employees. 64 Another alternative to the supervisory relationship would be
to "allow both [spouses] to advance at their own rate[s] but [to forbid] the
higher placed spouse.. . [from making] decisions concerning the mate."
65
These alternatives can effectively address business concerns without
unduly burdening the rights of employees.
Proponents of antispouse and antinepotism rules also argue that
policies disqualifying an applicant or employee who is married to a
competitor's employee are necessary given the need to protect business
confidentiality. Such policies are legitimate, according to employers,
because married people may reveal important confidential information
about their jobs or employers to a spouse.66 Once again, such concerns are
premised on the perceived inability of spouses to be objective members of
the workforce. No-spouse policies that address concerns about spouses
working for competitors are paternalistic because they assume that the
spouses are unable to act professionally and ethically in such a situation.
C. Embracing Relatives and Spouses: The New Workforce
Some antinepotism laws in effect today are so archaic that they date
back to the 1800s. For example, in the spring of 1995, President Bill
Clinton nominated William A. Fletcher to a federal judgeship.67 At that
time, Mr. Fletcher's mother, Betty Binns Fletcher, was a seventeen-year
veteran of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. In an effort to block
Mr. Fletcher's appointment, opponents of his nomination cited an 1888
law, amended in 1911, which states that "[n]o person shall be appointed to
or employed in any office or duty in any court who is related by affinity or
between spouses. See, e.g., WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 162-16-150 (1980) (restricting no-
spouse employment policies with exceptions for compelling business interests and
supervisory relationship between spouses).
64. DECKER, supra note 20, at 340 (noting that "[e]mployer policies regarding no
spouses will have the best chance of being sustained when they do not outright forbid
employment").
65. Bierman & Fisher, supra note 32, at 637. Note, however, that such an alternative
may not be feasible in a rigidly structured bureaucracy. See id.
66. See Anti-Nepotism Policies Said Increasing, supra note 17, at C-1.
67. See Joan Biskupic, Panel Votes on Mother-Son Judgeships; Professor Approved
After Liberal Parent Agrees to Semi-Retirement, WASH. PosT, May 17, 1996, at A3.
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consanguinity within the degree of first cousin to any justice or judge of
such court., 68 Although the decision to apply the archaic law in this case is
best explained as a product of political partisanship, 69 its existence and
acceptance illustrates that antinepotism policies (and more specifically no-
spouse policies) need to be reexamined for their effectiveness and necessity
in this changed arena.
One reason why no-spouse policies have endured is that "a generation
ago, corporate America was more prudish. 7°  Companies did not look
favorably on office romances, and, therefore, no-spouse and
antifraternization policies became an effective tool to curb such romances.
Recently, however, prudishness has been replaced by concerns about
sexual harassment suits in the workplace. One commentator notes that
"[p]erhaps due to concern for potential liability for sexual harassment,
employers have promulgated policies forbidding dating or sexual
relationships between supervisors and those under their control or, more
broadly, between all coworkers. In some cases, discipline has been
imposed without a formal policy in place. 71
While the American workforce has changed dramatically, workplaces
have been slow to implement changes. In 1950, only an estimated
72seventeen million American women worked outside of the home. By
1984, that number had tripled to fifty million.73 Between 1982 and 1992,
women accounted for sixty percent of the labor force growth. 74
Recognizing this change in the workforce, some companies have permitted
the employment of spouses, albeit reluctantly. Although the trend has not
gained widespread acceptance, corporate America has given spouses a
modest reception in the workplace. As one recent article reported:
[U]nlike the situation in years past.., many... couples now
find their companies actually encouraging them to get together.
Gone are the days when office relationships were scorned for fear
of favoritism, impropriety or security problems. Now, some
companies-regardless of size, industry, age or location-are
providing opportunities for people to socialize, date and find
68. Id.
69. See id. (noting that the antinepotism law had not previously been used to stop the
rare situation of close relatives serving on the bench together).
70. Susan Diesenhouse, Once Taboo, Office Romance Now Encouraged In Some Firms;
Happily Coupled Employees Believed To Be More Productive, STAR TRIB. (MINNEAPOLIS-
ST. PAUL), May 19, 1996, at 10E.
71. MATrHEwW. FNKO, PRivAcYINEMPLOYMENTLAW 153 (1995).
72. See Peggy A. Simpson, A Revolution in the Workplace, in TIE 1985 WORLD BOOK
YEARBOOK 119, 119.
73. See id.
74. See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Access to Historical Data for the "A" Tables of the
Employment Situation News Release (visited Oct. 30, 1998) <http://www.bls.gov/
cpsatabs.htm>.
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mates.75
The reasons for this trend are simple-people are working harder and
working longer.76 Also, the need for highly-skilled workers is greater now
than it has ever been. As a result, companies are being forced to institute
more employee-friendly policies, such as day care facilities and flexible
hours, in order to keep personnel satisfied. According to Joanne Brandes,
Vice President of Communications for Johnson Wax in Racine, Wisconsin,
her company, which once banned married couples from its staff, decided to
adapt because employees, women in particular, did not react favorably to
such restrictive policies. 77 Furthermore, the combination of longer working
hours and the increased presence of women in the workforce has made
78office romances a more common occurrence in many companies.
Hiring spouses does have advantages for employers. For instance, an
employer may experience less turnover because couples are less likely to
look for new jobs.79 Employers who want to lure exceptional candidates
may be more successful in obtaining those candidates if they offer
employment to the spouse as well. 80 Employers may also find a spouse to
be more highly qualified than unrelated job candidates. 8' In that situation it
would be unfair to the organization to "pass up the best candidate simply
because his or her spouse is already employed with the firm., 82  Most
importantly, an employee may find it more satisfying to work with a spouse
than to work with an unrelated employee or alone, thus improving the
quality of work. "[P]eople do a better, more productive job if they are
happy, and human resources officers find that workers are happy when
mingling at the office is not taboo. 'There is a direct link between
employee satisfaction, customer satisfaction and higher corporate
profits.' ' 83 Moreover, employees may regard their places of employment
more favorably if their employers embrace spouses and families. 84
Another reason for abandoning no-spouse policies is that they may
produce an adverse effect on women. As Wexler notes:
75. See Diesenhouse, supra note 70, at 10E.
76. See id. (noting that forty-five percent of American workers work more than forty
hours a week, while ten percent work more than sixty hours, according to the Families and
Work Institute of New York).
77. See id.
78. See id. (noting that at least thirty-three percent of all romances now start at work).
79. See Kim, supra note 49, at 419.
80. See id. at 420.
81. Seeid. at419.
82. Bierman & Fisher, supra note 32, at 636.
83. Diesenhouse, supra note 70, at 10E.
84. See id. Cf. Wexler, supra note 5, at 79 ("[B]y enhancing the interests of one spouse
at the other's expense, antinepotism rules may be causing more friction in the home than
they prevent in the workplace.").
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This effect is both direct and subtle. When a rule requires that
one spouse leave the workplace, or not be invited in, for various
reasons that spouse in all likelihood will be female. Furthermore,
because women generally enter the labor market on a permanent
basis later than men, a policy which limits the employment of
spouses necessarily favors men over women.
85
Therefore, employers "may aid in reaching affirmative action goals"
by abandoning no-spouse policies and, in turn, may promote goodwill
toward their employees.86
II. ROADBLOCKS TO SUCCESSFULLY CHALLENGING NO-SPOUSE
POLICIES IN THE COURTS
A. No-Spouse Policies and Marital Status Discrimination: A Definitional
Nightmare
As noted earlier, no-spouse and antinepotism policies exist in various
forms.8 7 Some company policies may prohibit either relatives or spouses
(or both) from working at the same plant, office, branch, department, or
company. Other policies may prohibit a supervisory relationship between
spouses and/or relatives.8 8 Some companies consider the identity of one's
spouse when making hiring and firing decisions.89 Complications may
arise in the application of antispouse and antinepotism policies because
statutes and policies often provide ambiguous definitions of "spouse,"
"relative," and "marital status."
1. "Spouse" and "Relative"
A "spouse" is, most obviously, a legally-recognized husband or wife.
Not so obviously, the term "spouse" has been interpreted to include persons
who are not legally married but are cohabiting, "with all the attendant
responsibilities and commitments" of a legally-recognized married
couple.
90
A relative is one "connected by blood or affinity." 91 Given this broad
85. Wexler, supra note 5, at 79 (footnotes omitted).
86. Bierman & Fisher, supra note 32, at 637.
87. See Wexler, supra note 5, at 81-82.
88. See Humphress, supra note 12, at 927.
89. See id. at 929.
90. Espinoza v. Thoma, 580 F.2d 346, 349 (8th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he interpretation of the
word 'spouse' to include a person who lives in an espoused relationship is valid and
logical.").
91. THE NEW AMERicAN WEBSTER HANDY DIcTIoNARY 445 (1981).
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definition, an antinepotism policy that simply prohibits "relatives" from
working together is ambiguous and likely to be misapplied. For example,
the term "relative" may be extended to include "mother, father, sister,
brother, child, stepmother, stepfather, stepsister, stepbrother, stepchild,
niece, nephew, cousin, uncle, aunt, grandparent, grandchild, and in-laws
within these categories. 92 The employer generally bears the responsibility
of specifying which relatives are covered by its antinepotism policy.
2. Marital Status
Most employers provide their employees with employee handbooks
containing statements affirming their commitment to provide equal
employment opportunities to all persons. These handbook clauses
generally mirror state statutory provisions extending similar protections to
married couples.93 However, statutes that specifically prohibit marital
status discrimination rarely provide a reliable definition of "marital status."
Of the twenty states (plus the District of Columbia) that prohibit private
employers from discriminating against employees based upon marital
status,94 only six legislatures provide a definition of "marital status." 95
92. Bless Stritar Young & Alisa M. Chevalier, A Model Anti-Nepotism Policy, 42 PRAC.
LAW. 75, 78 (1996).
93. Note that only twenty states plus the District of Columbia prohibit marital status
discrimination by a private employer. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.200(a) (Michie 1996);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (West 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(1) (West
1995); DEL. CODE ANN. fit. 19, § 71 l(a)(1) (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512(a) (1992);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10(l)(a) (West 1997); HAw. REV. STAT. § 378-2(1) (1993); ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/1-102(A), 5/2-102(A) (West 1993); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(a)
(1997); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 37.2202(1)(a) (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03
(West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303(a) (1997); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-1115 (1995);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-A:7(I) (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (West 1996);
N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(1)(a) (McKinney 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4.03 (1997); OR.
REV. STAT. § 659.030(1)(a) (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-715 (Michie 1987); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 49.60.180(1) (West 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.321 (West 1988).
94. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.200(a) (Michie 1996); CAL. GOv'T CODE § 12940(a)
(West 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(1) (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19,
§ 711(a)(1) (1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2512(a) (1992); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.10(l)(a)
(West 1997); HAw. REv. STAT. § 378-2(1) (1993); ILL. COMr. STAT. 5/1-102(A), 5/2-
102(A) (West 1993); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 16(a) (1997); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §
37.2202(l)(a) (West 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. §
49-2-303(a) (1997); NEB. REv. STAT. § 48-1115 (1995); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 354-
A:7(1) (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (West 1996); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 296(l)(a)
(McKinney 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4.03 (1997); OR. REv. STAT. § 659.030(1)(a)
(1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-715 (Michie 1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.180(1)
(West 1996); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.321 (West 1988).
95. See Humphress, supra note 12, at 927 & n.55 (stating that only Hawaii, Illinois,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia provide statutory definitions
of marital status and that "[little accord exists as between these definitions").
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Furthermore, these definitions vary from state to state. Some states define
marital status as the status of being married or single.96 Other states go
further and define it as the status of being married, single, divorced,
separated, or widowed.97 Adding to this confusion, the courts are split on
whether the term "marital status," as used in state statutes, should be
interpreted narrowly or broadly.98  The cases that follow provide
illuminating illustrations of this definitional nightmare.
a. The Narrow Interpretation
In Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement,99 an Illinois court
interpreting that state's antidiscrimination statute held that "marital status
discrimination," as defined by the statute, did not prohibit discrimination
based upon the identity of one's spouse. 1°° In that case, Jim and Colleen
Boaden were both state troopers assigned to the same squad. 10 1 When they
informed their supervisor of their plans to marry, the captain informed
them that "an unwritten policy existed which prohibited spouses from
working in the same squad, patrolling the same area at the same time."1°2
[The captain's] stated reason for the policy was a fear that
married troopers might not react with objectivity if one were
injured, might present supervisory problems, and might become
dissatisfied with the arrangement because troopers on the same
squad did not have the same vacation and days off. In addition,
[Captain] Ryan was concerned that their credibility could be
questioned as witnesses in court or internal investigations.
103
After the Boadens filed charges with the Illinois Human Rights
Commission, the Commission rejected the State Police argument that its
antinepotism policy was not marital status discrimination. The
Commission found that "marital status does include the identity of an
employee's spouse and noted that had petitioners not married, no action
96. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 378-1 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-1102(12) (1995).
97. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(17) (1992); ILL. Com,'. STAT. 1-103(J) (West
1993); Wisc. STAT. § 111.32(12) (1988).
98. See Giattina, supra note 14, at 1116 ("The interpretation of the term 'marital status'
is at issue in those states prohibiting marital status discrimination because few state
legislatures sufficiently clarified their intent upon enacting their respective statutes.
Consequently, state courts have the burden of determining legislative intent until the
respective legislature [sic] adequately defines the term.").
99. 642 N.E.2d 1330 (I11. App. Ct. 1994).
100. See id. at 1335.
101. See id. at 1331.
102. Id. at 1331-32.
103. Id. at 1332.
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would have been taken against them." 1°4
The Illinois Appellate Court rejected the Illinois Human Rights
Commission's statutory interpretation that marital status discrimination
includes acts based upon the identity of a spouse; in fact, the court refused
to construe the terms liberally to achieve the purpose of the statute.105 The
court found that "[i]f the legislature [had] intended to proscribe policies
based upon an individual's marital relationship to another, it would have
stated as much in express terms."
106
Similarly, in Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc.,10 7 the Alaska
Supreme Court ruled that the state's antidiscrimination statute, l0 s which
includes a marital status provision, does not prevent an employer from
discriminating against an employee based upon the identity of a spouse. In
that case, Muller and Relkin became romantically involved while working
at British Petroleum ("BP"). Having informed BP of their relationship, BP
replied that, while there was no express policy forbidding their relationship,
if the relationship led to marriage, Relkin would have to step down as
training coordinator.
0 9
The Alaska Supreme Court found that the term "marital status," if
construed in accordance with its common usage, refers only to the "actual
condition of being married or unmarried.""10 The term, therefore, "does not
extend to include the identity of the person to whom one is married." '111
Furthermore, the court found that "the purpose of [the statute] is to prohibit
discrimination against a person based on his or her condition of being
married or unmarried, not on the identity of one's spouse. To whom one is
married is not a class-defining factor, unlike all the other factors listed in
104. Id. In its decision, the Commission relied on River Bend Community Unit School
District No. 2 v. Human Rights Commission, 597 N.E.2d 842 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). See id.
However, the Commission dismissed the Boadens' claim because "the actions taken b, the
State Police had not altered the terms or conditions of petitioners' employment in violation
of the Illinois Human Rights Act." Id. at 1331. The Boadens appealed that decision.
105. See Boaden, 642 N.E.2d. at 1334 (citing the Commission's interpretation of
"marital discrimination" in a previous case).
106. Id. at 1335.
107. 923 P.2d 783 (Alaska 1996).
108. Alaska Statute § 18.80.220(a) provides, in relevant part:
[I]t is unlawful for.., an employer to refuse employment to a person... or to
discriminate against a person.., because of the person's age, physical or
mental disability, sex, marital status, changes in marital status, pregnancy or
parenthood when the reasonable demands of the position do not require
distinction on the basis of age, physical or mental disability, sex, marital status,
changes in marital status, pregnancy or parenthood.
ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220(a)(1) (Michie 1997) (emphasis added).
109. See Muller, 923 P.2d at 785.
110. Id. at 788.
111. Id.
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[the statute]. ' ' n 2
Courts commonly justify their narrow interpretations of marital status
by referring to legislative intent." 3 For example, one court reasoned that
"[a] legislature's failure to discuss the specific meaning and effect of the
term 'marital status' indicates that it did not intend the term to include the
identity of one's spouse."'"I 4 In Whirlpool Corp. v. Michigan Civil Rights
Commission, the Michigan Supreme Court interpreted marital status to
refer only to a person's status as married, single, divorced, or widowed. 115
The majority concluded that a narrow interpretation of marital status was
consistent with the legislative intent because, had the legislature intended a
broader interpretation, they would have been more explicit.'
16
Similarly, the court in Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc. v. New York State
Human Rights Appeal Board,n 7 construed the term "marital status" to
include only the status of being married, single, divorced, separated, or
widowed.11 8 In that case, the plaintiff had been employed under the
supervision of her husband for four years before being discharged. In
reviewing her claims, the New York Court of Appeals observed that the
legislature did not intend "to prohibit discrimination based on an
individual's marital relationships rather than simply on an individual's
marital status. 1 9 Furthermore, "[t]he disqualification of the complainant
was not for being married, but for being married to her supervisor."'
' 20
According to the court in Boaden, these narrow interpretations
generally rest on the view that the statutory language refers to the
general classification of marital status as a status, rather than to
spousal identity, and thus the legislature would not have enlarged
the proscription and extended a right to be employed by the same
112. Id. at 791.
113. See, e.g., id. at 788; Whirlpool Corp. v. Michigan Civil Rights Comm'n, 390
N.W.2d 625, 627 (Mich. 1986).
114. Muller, 923 P.2d at 788; see Giattina, supra note 14, at 1116 (explaining that "few
state legislatures sufficiently clarified their intent upon enacting" no-spouse employment
policies). Compare Humphress, supra note 12, at 930 (citing Kraft v. Minnesota Dep't of
Human Rights, 284 N.W.2d 386 (Minn. 1979), which referred to legislative intent in
granting a broad interpretation to marital status).
115. See Whirlpool, 390 N.W.2d 625 (Mich. 1986).
116. See id. at 627. Note, however, that no legislative history was available to aid in
determining legislative intent regarding marital status. See Giattina, supra note 14, at 1122
n.77.
117. 415 N.E.2d 950 (N.Y. 1980).
118. See id. at 964; see also Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Greenbelt
Homes, Inc., 475 A.2d 1192, 1196 (Md. 1984) ("As we see it, 'marital status' connotes
whether one is married or not married."); Miller v. C.A. Muer Corp., 362 N.W.2d 650, 653
(Mich. 1984) (holding that the state statute mandated inquiry into whether the
discrimination was based on marital status, not spousal identity).
119. Manhattan Pizza Hut, Inc., 415 N.E.2d at 953.
120. Id. at 954.
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employer as one's spouse without a clearer expression of its
intent.1
21
To rely on a lack of legislative intent to justify a narrow interpretation
of marital status belies the entire problem. Antidiscrimination statutes are
promulgated to remove discriminatory practices from the workplace. That
is their over-arching intent. By limiting a statute's application to instances
of pure marital status discrimination only, courts are not serving the
legislative intent of these statutes. Thus, their reliance on legislative intent
to justify applying a narrow interpretation is misplaced.
In general, a narrow interpretation of marital status makes it harder to
challenge spousal policies. 122 According to Professor Wexler, "successful
attacks against antinepotism policies may be maintained in states which
prohibit marital status discrimination if courts [apply a broader
interpretation] ... rather than the approach of... Pizza Hut."' 3 The
reasons for this are obvious-the more subtle forms of discrimination
produced by no-spouse and antinepotism policies cannot be included under
the narrow interpretation of marital status. Rather than leave it up to the
courts, a more effective solution would be for legislatures to explicitly
define the parameters of marital status or for "human rights commissions to
promulgate specific regulations to clarify the application of
antidiscrimination statutes to antinepotism policies and practices."'124 This
clarity of intent, although ideal and unlikely in our day, would leave the
courts with little choice but to broaden their interpretations of "marital
status."
b. The Broader Interpretation
A broader definition of marital status was applied in Thompson v.
Board of Trustees.125 In that case, the school district barred spouses of
school administrators from being employed in any capacity by the school
system.126  In holding that the employer's no-spouse rule violated the
state's antidiscrimination statute, the Montana Supreme Court rejected a
narrow interpretation of marital status in favor of a broad interpretation. 127
The court held that the term "marital status," for purposes of the Montana
121. Boaden v. Department of Law Enforcement, 642 N.E.2d 1330, 1334 (11. App. Ct.
1994).
122. See Humphress, supra note 12, at 932.
123. Wexler, supra note 5, at 131.
124. Id. at 131-32.
125. 627 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Mont. 1981).
126. See id. at 1230.
127. See id. at 1231 ("We find that the term 'marital status' should be more broadly
interpreted to accomplish the legislative objective of removing discriminatory practices in
employment. ... ").
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statute, included the identity and occupation of an individual's spouse.1
28
The court concluded further that because the Board of Trustees had
terminated a superintendent and demoted a school administrator because of
their marriages to teachers within the school system, the school district's
no-spouse policy violated the state prohibition against marital status
discrimination. 129
Similarly, in River Bend Community Unit School District No. 2 v.
Human Rights Commission, 130 the court accepted the Human Rights
Commission's liberal construction of the term "marital status" to include
the identity of one's spouse. 131 In that case, the River Bend Community
School District denied Virginia Ray a transfer to Fulton Elementary
School, where her husband was principal. 132 After Ray filed a complaint
with the Illinois Human Rights Commission, the appellate court
acknowledged that the Illinois Human Rights Act's 133 stated policy of
securing "for all individuals within Illinois the freedom from
discrimination... because of marital status ... in connection with
employment ' 34 reasonably could require them to construe the term
"marital status" liberally. 35
The school district in that case argued that their policy did not violate
the Human Rights Act because it presented a bona fide occupational
qualification exception. 136  The court rejected that claim, finding that
although the Act "should be liberally construed to effect its purposes,
the... exemptions must be construed narrowly."'
137
Courts that interpret marital status liberally reason that employees who
are transferred or terminated because they would be supervised by or
supervising a spouse are being singled out because of marital status. "If the
employee were to divorce or to remain single and cohabit with the
supervising or supervised employee, the employee would not be subject to
the [no-spouse] policy.' 38 This, according to one commentator, leads to an
"absurd result."'
39
128. See id.
129. See id. at 1231-32.
130. 597 N.E.2d 842 (111. App. Ct. 1992).
131. Seeid. at846.
132. See id. at 843-44.
133. See 775 ILL. CoMp. STAT. 5/1-102 (West 1998).
134. 775 ILL. CoMiP. STAT. 5/1-102(A) (West 1998).
135. See River Bend, 597 N.E.2d at 845.
136. See id. at 846.
137. Kim, supra note 49, at 415.
138. Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 793 (Alaska 1996)
(Compton, C.J., dissenting).
139. Wexler, supra note 5, at 128 (quoting Thompson v. Board of Trustees, 627 P.2d
1229, 1231 (Mont. 1981).
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B. The Case for a Broader Definition
Marital status occupies a unique position in antidiscrimination
legislation.
Unlike sex, race, or disability... a person can change [his or her]
marital status with relative ease. It is not uncommon for some
individuals to be single, then marry, later divorce, and then marry
again. Therefore, a person's marital status may change several
times, whereas for most people race, sex, and disability are
immutable characteristics. 14'
Marital status's inherent flexibility requires courts to consider it in its
broadest context. This need for a more expansive definition of marital
status stems from the fact that the federal government offers little or no
protection against employment discrimination based on marital status.
Because the federal government offers no employment protection to
married couples, many states have enacted statutes prohibiting marital
status discrimination in various areas, including employment, housing,
public accommodations, and credit. Hence, aggrieved employees must
hope that their states have enacted statutes that prohibit marital status
discrimination.
14 1
As the number of... statutes [with marital status provisions]
indicates, many states are seriously concerned about marital
status discrimination by private employers. As the federal
government persists in denying protection from employment
discrimination based on marital status, state law continues to
shape and define this discriminatory employment practice.142
1. Lack of Federal Remedies
Although the Supreme Court has long recognized a person's
fundamental right to marry, 143 federal legislation has not provided any
guarantee that, once married, individuals will be protected in their places of
employment from hiring and firing decisions made based on their marital
140. Beattie, supra note 22, at 1428 (footnote omitted).
141. Note that only twenty states (plus the District of Columbia) specifically prohibit
marital status discrimination. See supra note 93. However, all but four states have some
form of a fair employment practices act protecting against employment discrimination by
private employers. See Giattina, supra note 14, at 1116 n.33 (noting that Alabama,
Arkansas, Mississippi, and Virginia do not have state statutes that protect employees from
discrimination by private employers).
142. Humphress, supra note 12, at 921 (footnote omitted).
143. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (noting that "[m]arriage is one of the
'basic civil rights of man' when declaring Virginia's miscegenation statute
unconstitutional).
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statuses. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,'44 the federal
antidiscrimination statute, makes it unlawful for an employer to
discriminate against employees on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin.145 Title VII does not, however, provide a federal cause of
action for discrimination based on marital status. 146 Furthermore, the
United States Supreme Court has held that the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") does not have the power to add new
items to the federal list of forbidden grounds of employment discrimination
under Title VII. 14 7 Despite these limitations of the federal Civil Rights Act,
no-spouse and antinepotism rules have been challenged under Title VII
using disparate impact or disparate treatment theories.1
48
In disparate treatment cases challenging marital status discrimination,
an employer must have "treated a married male employee differently than a
married female employee."' 49  This theory presents serious evidentiary
difficulties in marital discrimination claims. "Because no-spouse rules are
facially neutral, they do not literally fail to treat women and men on an
equal basis." 150  Thus, no policy or practice of discrimination will be
discernible. Moreover, as Wexler argues, direct proof for an intent to treat
women discriminatorily in all likelihood will be unavailable."
' 151
In disparate impact cases, a facially neutral policy may be held to have
a disproportionate effect on women (or men) working or seeking a job with
a company where their husbands (or wives) already work. 152 A challenge
to such a policy "does not require a showing of intent, 153 but it does
require a showing of disparate impact, primarily through statistical proof.1-4
This requirement places plaintiffs at a disadvantage because statistical
144. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1995).
145. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1995) (providing that "[i]t shall be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer.., to... discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin").
146. See Wexler, supra note 5, at 97 n.99 ("Title VII does not expressly address
discrimination on the basis of marital status, and no legislative history on that issue exists.").
147. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 93-94 (1973) (rejecting the EEOC's
broad interpretation of "national origin" to include citizenship); see also Humphress, supra
note 12, at 919-20.
148. See Kim, supra note 49, at 417; see also Humphress, supra note 12, at 925
("[S]tates readily apply many of the rules formulated under Title VII, despite the fact that
Title VII does not recognize marital status discrimination.").
149. Kim, supra note 49, at 417; see Giattina, supra note 14, at 1115 ("[An employment
policy prohibiting the employer from hiring wives of male employees, but not husbands of
female employees, is discriminatory on its face.").
150. Wexler, supra note 5, at 98.
151. Id.
152. See Kim, supra note 49, at 417.
153. Wexler, supra note 5, at 98.
154. See id. at 101.
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proof of disparate impact is hard to obtain and evaluate.
One approach in the use of statistics to measure disparate impact
involves "comparing the percentage of blacks or women in the general
population that are excluded by a particular employment requirement with
the percentage of excluded whites or males in the general population."
155
Another approach allows members of a protected class to establish a prima
facie case of disparate impact if they can show that "a given hiring practice
selects applicants for employment in a pattern that diverges significantly
from the makeup of the applicant pool. '156  Both approaches can be
problematic for plaintiffs because statistical evidence cannot prove the
actual existence of discrimination in any given case; it can only show a
probability that such discrimination occurred. As evidenced by the low
percentage of successful disparate impact cases, courts do not like to deal
with mere probabilities.
In EEOC v. Rath Packing Co.,157 the Eighth Circuit invalidated the
defendant's no-spouse policy on the grounds that the policy had a disparate
impact on women and therefore violated Title VI'.158 The court was
persuaded by the abundant statistical evidence produced by the plaintiff
showing that, during a five year period, only seven out of ninety-five
female applicants were hired. 159 Additionally, twenty-six women, whose
husbands were employed at Rath Packing, were denied employment during
this time. 16° As one commentator has pointed out, this case is "the seminal
case on the possible vulnerability of no-spouse rules under Title VII and
demonstrates the importance of using verifiable, cogent statistics to prove
disparate impact."'161 However, reliable and thorough statistics, such as
those produced in Rath Packing, are not always readily available to
plaintiffs, thereby making it difficult for plaintiffs to succeed under a
disparate impact theory.
In a disparate impact case, the employer may rebut the presumption of
discrimination by showing a "business necessity." This defense was
clearly articulated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,162 where the Supreme
Court held that an employer may withstand a challenge to a facially neutral
employment practice having a disparate impact on blacks if the employer
can prove that the challenged practice is a business necessity." The
business necessity defense, however, arises only after a plaintiff has
155. Id.
156. Id. at 102-03.
157. 787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1986).
158. See id. at 328.
159. See id. at 322.
160. See id.
161. Kim, supra note 49, at 417.
162. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
163. See id. at 432.
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established a successful prima facie case of disparate impact; thus, a
plaintiff with inadequate statistical evidence will be unable to point to an
employer's unjustified exclusionary policy as a means to bolster her case.
In Yuhas v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Co.,164 the Seventh Circuit dismissed
the plaintiff's statistical evidence and ruled in favor of the defendant
company, reasoning that because the employer had shown a reasonable
business necessity, and because women were not penalized because of
"their environmental or genetic background," there was no Title VII
violation. 165 In this case, the plaintiff had prevailed in district court by
showing that since the inception of the company's no-spouse rule, seventy-
one women and only three men had been denied employment by the
defendant. 166 The Seventh Circuit, however, found this statistical evidence
lacking.
167
In marital status discrimination cases under Title VII, an employer
should find it difficult to overcome a presumption of discrimination
because typical business rationales for implementing no-spouse and
antinepotism policies are not persuasive. Courts, however, have
consistently deferred to perceived legitimate business concerns where the
employer has demonstrated that its policy "is essential to the safe and
efficient operation of the business.16 Thus, even assuming that the
plaintiff has adequate statistical evidence to prove disparate impact, the
practical application of Title VII's disparate impact theory does not
generally result in favorable plaintiff verdicts.
2. The Fundamental Right to Marry
No-spouse policies have been challenged as a violation of the
employee's right to marry. It has been argued that no-spouse rules impinge
on the right to marry because "[o]ne is restrained or penalized for taking
part in life's basic relationship of husband and wife." 169 Such challenges
have generally been unsuccessful in court. 170 For example, in Parks v. City
of Warner Robins,171 the Eleventh Circuit held that the city's antinepotism
policy did not infringe on the fundamental right to marry because the
164. 562 F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977).
165. Id. at 500.
166. See id. at 496.
167. See id.
168. Wexler, supra note 5, at 111.
169. DECKER, supra note 20, at 335.
170. See Humphress, supra note 12, at 925 (noting that challenges raising constitutional
claims of a fundamental right to many are not easily won); Kim, supra note 49, at 418 ("In
all but one case this challenge has been unsuccessful.") (citation omitted).
171. 43 F.3d 609 (llth Cir. 1995).
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policy did not absolutely prevent the marriage of city workers. 72 The court
reasoned:
Any increased economic burden created by the anti-nepotism
policy [in this case the requirement that the spouse with less
seniority leave the department] is no more than an incidental
effect of a policy aimed at maintaining the operational efficiency
of Warner Robins' governmental departments, not a direct
attempt to control the marital decisions of city employees.
173
In Loving v. Virginia174 and Zablocki v. Redhail,175 the Supreme Court
recognized the right to marry as a fundamental right under the Constitution.
Despite this recognition, the Court in Zablocki made clear that not all
restrictions upon that right would receive strict scrutiny. 17 6 Therefore, it is
unlikely that a court would subject most state or federal antinepotism
policies to strict scrutiny.
177
In light of the Zablocki decision, courts employ a lower standard of
review in examining constitutional challenges to antinepotism policies.
This relaxed standard of review will, in effect, diminish the ability of
plaintiffs to prove an infringement on the right to marry. One commentator
has suggested that an employer's reasoning may easily pass muster:
If, as seems likely, courts review narrowly drawn antinepotism
rules under a minimum rationality standard, a plaintiff
challenging such a rule would have to demonstrate that it is not
rationally related to any legitimate government interest. The
defendant would assert that the rule avoids problems caused by
family favoritism and that it prevents conflicts of interest.1
78
Thus, challenging no-spouse policies on a constitutional level will
prove futile. However, courts considering other challenges to these
policies should not lose sight of the constitutional implications of no-
spouse policies.
III. CONCLUSION
Antinepotism and no-spouse policies are indefensible given the
172. See id. at 611. The policy did prevent marriage between supervisory employees
working in the same department. See id. at 612.
173. Id. at 614.
174. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that the choice to marry "resides with the individual
and cannot be infringed by the State").
175. 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (reaffirming the fundamental right of marriage and
delineating the state's power to regulate it).
176. See id. at 386.
177. See Wexler, supra note 5, at 118.
178. Id. at 122 (footnote omitted).
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changing trends in today's workforce. With more women entering the job
market, antinepotism policies are impeding the efforts of women to find
and keep jobs. Furthermore, existing interpretations of marital status do
not provide plaintiffs with any ammunition to challenge antinepotism and
no-spouse policies. Given the lack of federal remedies available to
plaintiffs, courts must begin to interpret the term "marital status" more
broadly. An expanded definition of marital status will enable plaintiffs
successfully to challenge unduly restrictive and antiquated antinepotism
policies.
